Compositional Verification
Compositional Verification Principle |= A : ψ X : ψ |= X ⊗ B : φ |= A ⊗ B : φ premises: local property of A and correctness of decomposition Scenarios for secure post-issuance loading 1. card issuer specifies φ and ψ and checks property decomposition; pre-load check of |= A : ψ 2. card issuer provides only φ, applet provider specifies ψ; pre-load check of |= A : ψ and property decomposition
Maximal Models
In certain setups: simulation preorder on components 1. property preserving 2. preserved by composition ⊗ 3. for any formula ψ, the set of models for ψ has a maximal element M ax(ψ) wrt. the preorder: maximal model [Grumberg & Long '94] |= M ax(ψ) ⊗ B : φ X : ψ |= X ⊗ B : φ
Maximal Model Principle

The Framework: Models, Simulation and Logic
Components Applets
• control-flow
• structure, induces behaviour
• unfied treatment: model
• set of atomic propositions A
• valuation λ : S → P(A)
Simulation Preorder ≤
• standard, on states
Simulation Logic modal logic with:
• box modalities (only)
• greatest fixed-point recursion (only)
• conditions 1-3 are satisfied 
1. a) Specify global property ψ as a behavioural property b) For applet A, specify local property σ as a structural property 2. Verify the correctness of the property decomposition: • loyalties use log information to determine loyalty points
• purse provides logFull service to warn loyalties before overwriting log Bad scenario featuring loyalties AirFrance and RentACar
• loyalty AirFrance subscribed to logFull service (and has paid for it!)
• AirFrance.logFull calls partner loyalty RentACar (e.g. to ask for balance)
• RentACar, not subscribed to logFull, deduces log might be full, asks purse for log • extract loyalty and purse interfaces: I L and I P (SOOT-based tool)
• generate maximal applets: θ I L (ψ L ) and θ I P (ψ P ) (own tool)
Local Properties
• extract applet control graphs: L and P (SOOT-based tool)
• finite-state model checking: L |= s ψ L and P |= s ψ P (CWB)
Main Shortcomings
1. Requires knowledge of the complete interface, but in a truly compositional setting we can only assume knowledge of the names of the public methods 2. Interfaces are significantly larger than public ones, which is critical for the applicability of the (exponential) maximal model construction
Interface Abstraction
Public and Private Methods M ⊆ I + A a set of public methods
Transformation transforms applet A with interface (I
• simulation: w.r.t. public behaviour, or interface behaviour
• transformation: inlining of private methods
Interface Behaviour
An abstraction on applet behaviour wrt. M ⊆ I + A
• keep configurations unchanged
• relabel configurations -current control is in the top-most public method of v · σ
• relabel transitions accordingly -configuration-dependent relabelling
The Inlining Transformation Inlining replace method call by method body
• need to: guarantee termination, prove simulation
• execute m so that:
• label local calls and returns by ε
• treat calls to public methods as local transfer, but keep label
• replace recursion by iteration 
Last-call recursion call edges are followed by transfer edges only Theorem Let A : I be last-call recursive, and M ⊆ I 2. Verify the correctness of the property decomposition:
Practical Impact of Inlining • Some natural structural properties are only expressible as properties of the inlined applet
Conclusion
We presented
• An algorithmic method:
• for compositional verification
• of control-flow based safety properties
• of structure and behaviour
• of sequential programs with procedures
• Refinement:
• discriminating between public and private methods
• interface abstraction: in-lining of private methods
Current work
• refining the program model: exceptions, multi-threading
• maximal models for behavioural properties
Publications
• Verification Framework: MemoCode'04
• Case Study: FASE'04 (win)
• Interface Abstraction: SEFM'05
• Journal Version: JIC
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